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Floating on a Sea of Funny Money: An 
Analysis of Money Laundering Through 
Miami Real Estate and the Federal 
Government’s Attempt to Stop it 
Gary McPherson* 
Miami is experiencing a money laundering controversy the likes 
of which have not been seen since the “Cocaine Cowboys” era of 
1980’s Miami. Condominiums and other mega developments are 
popping up at an unprecedented pace, immediately after the 
housing market crash that caused the Great Recession. Adding to 
this questionable boom in development is the fact that the vast 
majority of Miami’s population cannot afford to live in places like 
these. So, the question presented is who is fueling this explosion 
in development? Criminals, that’s who. Federal agents believe 
criminals are buying coveted Miami real estate through shell 
companies to launder their ill–gotten money. 
In response to this crisis, the Department of the Treasury’s 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a 
Geographic Targeting Order (GTO) that requires Miami title 
insurers to report information about the identities of those hiding 
behind shell companies to buy real estate in cash purchases. 
Through the order, FinCEN aims to gain information about and 
deter potential money launderers. The GTO places Miami 
squarely in the cross–hairs of FinCEN’s anti–money laundering 
regime. However, there is a problem: the GTO will not actually 
prevent money laundering. There are fundamental issues with the 
GTO: it is underinclusive and riddled with loopholes and 
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ambiguities. These issues are easily resolved by a more inclusive, 
detailed drafting of the GTO that eliminates the many loopholes 
and clarifies the latent ambiguities inherent in it. However, as 
currently written, the GTO’s many issues prevent it from 
effectively fighting money laundering in Miami, but they also 
shelter Miami’s real estate market from the potential negative 
effects that many feared the GTO would cause. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Miami is in the midst of a housing crisis, the likes of which have not 
been seen since the “Cocaine Cowboys” era of 1980’s Miami. Biscayne’s 
wondrous shore is once again awash with “funny money” that is driving 
the luxury real estate market.1 Condominiums and other mega 
developments are rising at an unprecedented rate, immediately after the 
nation’s worst housing crash in its history.2 The vast majority of Miami’s 
population cannot even afford to live in places like these, adding more 
suspicion to the already questionable boom in development.3 These 
abnormalities raise a critical question: what is fueling this explosion of 
development? Federal agents hypothesize that criminals are buying 
precious Miami real estate, through the veil of shell companies, to launder 
their ill–gotten money.4 
If this story sounds familiar, that is because it is; Miami has a long 
history of money laundering, dating back to the days of the “Cocaine 
Cowboys.”5 While imported Colombian cocaine flooded the streets of 
South Florida, drug traffickers and dealers laundered the proceeds of their 
enterprises through Miami real estate.6 During this period in the 1980’s, 
criminals laundered billions in ill–gotten gains through Miami banks and 
real estate.7 This enormous influx of cash significantly shaped Miami’s 
real estate industry and landscape.8 The beautiful skyline that Miami is 
known for, “[c]ocaine was the currency that built that skyline.”9 
The reemergence of large–scale money laundering in Miami is 
partially a result of the real estate and banking industries’ laissez–faire 
attitude toward acceptance of large sums of cash. Because Miami’s real 
estate and banking industries “grew up in the [Cocaine Cowboys] era . . . 
the attitude here has always been to make a quick deal and don’t ask any 
                                                                                                             
1 See Nicholas Nehamas, How Secret Offshore Money Helps Fuel Miami’s Luxury 
Real–Estate Boom, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 3, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.miamiherald.
com/news/business/real-estate-news/article69248462.html#storylink=cpy. 
2 See Brian Bandell, Cash, Condos & Criminals: The Big Loophole For Money 
Laundering, S. FLA. BUS. J. (Aug. 30, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
southflorida/print-edition/2013/08/30/llcs-offer-secrecy-to-foreign-criminal.html. 
3 See Nehamas, supra note 1 (stating that “[m]oney from people linked to wrongdoing 
abroad is helping to power the gleaming condo towers rising on South Florida’s waterfront 
and pushing home prices far beyond what most locals can afford”). 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See Ken Silverstein, Miami: Where Luxury Real Estate Meets Dirty Money, THE 
NATION (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/miami-where-luxury-real-
estate-meets-dirty-money/. 
7 See id. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
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questions.”10 This “anything goes” culture in Miami’s real estate market 
makes Miami a perfect place to launder money.11 So, it is no surprise that 
money launderers have reared their ugly heads once again. 
In April 2016, Miami Herald coverage of the “Panama Papers,” a leak 
of thousands of documents from the secretive Panamanian law firm 
Mossack Fonseca, revealed that criminals, including corrupt foreign 
government officials, were purchasing luxury real estate in Miami through 
shell corporations to launder their ill–gotten money.12 The “Panama 
Papers” seem to be the missing piece in the puzzle allowing law 
enforcement to see the whole picture and understand exactly how 
criminals have been laundering their money undetected through Miami’s 
real estate.13 
Another catalyst for the federal government to take action was a case 
in September 2014 involving a Spanish drug lord who used companies to 
purchase thirteen Miami condos to launder money from his lucrative 
cocaine–smuggling business.14 This case shined a spotlight on Miami’s 
money laundering problem and exposed it to the world.15 In January 2016, 
following that case and the Panama Papers leak, the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—a bureau of the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury tasked with safeguarding the financial system from illicit use, 
combating money laundering, and promoting national security—issued a 
Geographic Targeting Order (GTO) to crackdown on money laundering in 
Miami.16 
The GTO requires title insurance companies to report the identity of 
the beneficial owners—individuals who, directly or indirectly, own 25% 
or more of the equity interests of a company17—of shell companies that 
purchase real estate with cash.18 “In Miami–Dade [County], the rule 
applies to homes sold for $1 million or more.”19 The government sees the 
GTO as a start to a potentially larger crackdown on money laundering and 
                                                                                                             
10 Id. 
11 See id. (asserting that Miami appeals to money launderers because “banks and real 
estate developers have frequently played fast and loose with the rules”). 
12 See Nehamas, supra note 1. 
13 See generally id. (describing how Mossack Fonseca structured real estate purchase 
deals in a manner that shielded their clients’ money laundering from the government). 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See Nicholas Nehamas, Feds crack down on secret real estate deals in Miami–Dade 
and New York, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 13, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/
news/business/real-estate-news/article54450795.html. 
17 Jamal El–Hindi, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Geographic Targeting Order (July 27, 
2016), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Title_Ins_GTO_Sample_072716.
pdf [hereinafter GTO]. 
18 See Nehamas, supra note 1. 
19 See id. 
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a means to collect information on people who may be money laundering.20 
However, many professionals in the South Florida real estate industry fear 
that the GTO could have a “chilling effect on the luxury [real estate] 
market.”21 The issuance of the GTO and the public’s concerns raise 
important questions about the GTO’s impact on Miami’s real estate 
industry. 
This comment seeks to answer whether the GTO will be an effective 
anti–money laundering (AML) tactic and whether the GTO will negatively 
impact Miami’s real estate market through analysis of the GTO itself and 
the circumstances that led to the issuance of the GTO. Part II illustrates 
why AML policy is necessary in Miami by detailing the events that caused 
FinCEN’s issuance of the GTO, including a depiction of Miami’s history 
of money laundering in the “Cocaine Cowboys” era and a portrayal of 
Miami’s current money laundering problem. Part III thoroughly explains 
the GTO itself by defining what a GTO is, what it is used for, and what it 
requires. Part IV identifies and explains the significance of various issues 
inherent in the GTO and offers suggestions to remedy them. Part V 
explains the GTO’s effects on the real estate industry and argues that the 
GTO will neither prevent money laundering, nor have any significant 
negative impact on Miami’s real estate market, because the GTO’s many 
issues render it ineffective as an AML tool and mitigate its potential 
negative effects on the real estate market. Part VI synthesizes the analysis 
of the GTO and its impact on Miami’s real estate industry. 
II. WHY AML POLICY IS NEEDED—BISCAYNE’S WONDROUS SHORE 
IS AWASH WITH FUNNY MONEY 
The question presented by the section—why anti–money laundering 
policy is needed in Miami—seemingly has a simple answer: Miami is 
awash in a sea of ill–gotten money that is fueling a boom in real estate 
development reminiscent of the “Cocaine Cowboys” era.22 But, explaining 
why this explosion in money laundering is occurring is a more 
complicated, yet necessary, endeavor. Solving the money laundering 
problem requires an understanding of the cause of the problem, not just 
the problem itself. 
                                                                                                             
20 See id. 
21 Nehamas, supra note 16. 
22 See Nehamas, supra note 1. 
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A. The Issue: Use of Shell Companies to Launder Money Through 
Miami Real Estate 
The Department of the Treasury issued the GTO to combat criminals’ 
use of shell companies to buy real estate and launder their illegally 
obtained profits. Money laundering “refers to financial transactions in 
which criminals, including terrorist organizations, attempt to disguise the 
proceeds, sources or nature of their illicit activities.”23 Money laundering 
is a serious concern because it “facilitates a broad range of serious 
underlying criminal offenses and ultimately threatens the integrity of the 
financial system.”24 Complicating this momentous issue further is 
criminals’ use of shell companies to launder money through real estate 
undetected.25 Shell companies are legal entities, such as Limited Liability 
Companies, that do not conduct business of their own but are often used 
to conduct illegal activities like money laundering or tax evasion.26 Of 
course, however, not all legal entities involved in real estate transactions 
are nefarious. 
B. Benefits of Common Legal Entities in Real Estate Transactions 
Legal entities are commonly used in real estate purchases and have a 
wide range of benefits and protections. One of the most preferred legal 
entities used in real estate transactions is a Limited Liability Company 
(“LLC”).27 An LLC “is a hybrid business entity” that “has some features 
of corporations and some features of partnerships, offering all of its 
members limited liability as if they were shareholders of a corporation but 
treating the entity and its members as a partnership for tax purposes.”28 Put 
simply, an LLC “is a form of legal entity that has the attributes of both a 
corporation and a partnership but is not formally characterized as either 
one.”29 Another legal entity commonly used in real estate transactions is 
the Business Trust, which is defined as an “unincorporated business 
organization created by an instrument by which property is to be held and 
managed by trustees for the benefit and profit of such persons as may be 
                                                                                                             
23 Money Laundering, Resource Center, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Pages/Money-Laundering.aspx. 
24 Id. 
25 See Nehamas, supra note 1 (“In Miami, secretive buyers often purchase expensive 
homes using opaque legal entities such as offshore companies . . . . [T]he secrecy that 
surrounds those companies makes it easy and tempting to break the law.”). 
26 See Nehamas, supra note 16. 
27 Jeff Weaver, Forming an LLC for Real Estate Investments: Pros & Cons, 
LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/forming-an-llc-for-real-estate-
investments-pros-cons. 
28 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limited Liability Companies § 1, Westlaw (database updated 2017). 
29 Id. 
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or may become the holders of transferable certificates evidencing the 
beneficial interests in the trust estate.”30 A final commonly used legal 
structure in real estate is the Limited Partnership, which  
is a type of partnership composed of one or more general 
partners, who manage the business and are personally 
liable for the partnership’s debts, and one or more limited 
partners, who contribute capital and share in the profits 
but take no part in running the business and incur no 
liability with respect to partnership obligations beyond 
their contribution.31 
These legal entities have various benefits and protections inherent in 
their construction that makes them attractive vehicles for real estate 
purchases. For most people, the primary benefit of holding real estate 
through one of the above legal entities is anonymity. The identities of 
people who purchase real estate through legal entities are not public 
record, only the names of the legal entities holding the properties are.32 
This is an important benefit for people in the public eye, such as “[a]ctors 
and athletes and politicians who don’t want the whole world potentially 
camping out on their front step.”33 Anonymity is particularly important in 
Miami because of the high volume of foreign nationals who own real 
estate in the city.34 “You see a lot of safety concerns with people from 
Brazil or Argentina,” said Alan Lips, an accountant at Gerson Preston.35 
“They don’t want people from their home country to go and look on the 
Internet and see that they paid a lot of money for a house and become a 
target for kidnapping.”36 Consequently, for many in Miami, anonymity is 
not just a benefit of using legal entities to purchase real estate, it is a matter 
of life or death. 
Another reason people use legal entities for real estate holdings is tax 
benefits. First and foremost, many legal entities are pass–through entities, 
which means that the businesses themselves do not get taxed, but the 
profits and losses of the businesses are “passed through” to the owners of 
                                                                                                             
30 13 AM. JUR. 2D Business Trusts § 1, Westlaw (database updated 2017). 
31 8B FLA. JUR. 2D Business Relationships § 729, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 
2017). 
32 Steve Reilly & Nick Penzenstadler, 7 Reasons Property Buyers Use LLCs, From Legit 
to Not, USA TODAY (Jun. 13, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/2017/06/13/7-reasons-property-buyers-use-llcs-legit-not/102387054/. 
33 Nehamas, supra note 16. 
34 See Nehamas, supra note 1 (“Foreign buyers made a quarter of Miami–Dade County’s 
home purchases in 2015.”). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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the business, who include their respective shares of the income on their 
individual tax returns.37 Considering the high volume of foreign nationals 
that own property in Miami, a significant benefit of holding real estate 
through legal entities is an estate tax loophole for foreigners.38 “Foreign 
buyers in particular are rarely advised to list their real names on deeds to 
protect against FIRPTA, an act by the IRS that subjects foreign investors 
to taxation for their U.S. real estate purchases,” said attorney Scott Marcus 
of Becker & Poliakoff.39 Accordingly, the primary reason most foreign 
real estate purchasers use legal entities to purchase real estate is to 
completely shield themselves from certain taxes. 
C. Using Legal Entities in Real Estate Transactions Makes Money 
Laundering Easier 
The widespread use of legal entities in real estate deals lets criminals 
launder money undetected through Miami real estate and creates a need 
for federal action against money laundering. The same benefits and 
protections that legal entities grant legitimate real estate purchasers shield 
criminals from federal law, allowing “people who utilize illegal funds” to 
“live a luxurious, unbelievable lifestyle.”40 Criminals use legal entities 
when purchasing real estate primarily because of the anonymity that legal 
entities grant all real estate purchasers. “The ownership privacy 
protections of LLC’s have made it more difficult to verify ownership,” 
said Michael McDonald, an international money laundering consultant 
and former IRS criminal investigator.41 “Organized criminal groups often 
use LLCs to buy real estate and conceal their identities because most states 
don’t require LLCs to list beneficial owners or changes in ownership.”42 
These protections granted by laws and legal entities allow criminals to 
form companies and “bury” themselves so no one, especially the 
government, knows who they are.43 This creates an especially difficult 
challenge for investigators tasked with uncovering money laundering 
schemes. The legal protections of entities like LLCs that cloak criminals 
                                                                                                             
37 See Partnerships, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/partnerships. 
38 See Nehamas, supra note 16. 
39 Sean Stewart–Muniz, Government Tracking of Secret Miami Buyers Begins Tuesday, 
THE REAL DEAL (Feb. 29, 2016, 2:15 PM), http://therealdeal.com/miami/2016/02/29/
government-tracking-of-secret-miami-buyers-begins-tomorrow/. 
40 Jay Weaver, Spaniard López Tardón Sent to Prison for 150 Years in Miami Money–
Laundering Case, MIAMI HERALD (Sep. 29, 2014, 1:19 PM), http://www.miamiherald.
com/news/local/crime/article2296479.html. 
41 See Bandell, supra note 2. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. 
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with invisibility evinces why the Department of the Treasury needed to 
issue the GTO—money laundering was too easy for criminals, and 
detection was too hard for investigators. 
D. Why Real Estate is a Common Vehicle for Money Laundering 
Real estate is such a common vehicle for money laundering because 
there is no effective regulation of real estate transactions that deters or 
makes money laundering difficult. The real estate industry as a whole is 
more lightly regulated than financial institutions, which have strict anti–
money laundering regulations.44 For example, “banks are required to file 
a Suspicious Activities Report (SAR) with the Treasury Department if 
they suspect a client is depositing or transferring corrupt money.”45 
Conveniently, real estate agents and title insurers have no such 
requirement.46 Further, “there’s much less regulation for putting cash into 
real estate transactions than for opening a deposit or securities account.”47 
This lack of regulation makes real estate a particularly attractive way for 
criminals to launder their dirty money.48 
“The regulation of real estate transactions for financial crime and 
money laundering is worse than Swiss cheese for all the holes it’s got,” 
said Charles Intriago, former assistant U.S. attorney and president of the 
Miami–based Association of Certified Financial Crime Specialists, which 
trains professionals to spot money laundering.49 Intriago’s scathing 
assessment of real estate regulation illustrates why money laundering 
through real estate is quite common—there is nothing deterring criminals. 
“You have criminal groups outside the U.S. trying to park money here. 
One of the best ways to do it is to buy real estate because no one asks who 
you are.”50 However, this is precisely what the government has begun to 
do. 
E. History of Money Laundering in Miami: The Cocaine Cowboys’ 
Effect on Miami Real Estate 
Miami has a long history of money laundering dating back to the late 
1970’s when “Latin American drug lords turned Miami into a key hub of 
their operations.”51 The drug lords, now commonly known as the Cocaine 
                                                                                                             
44 See Silverstein, supra note 6. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. 
47 Bandell, supra note 2. 
48 See Silverstein, supra note 6. 
49 Bandell, supra note 2. 
50 Id. 
51 Silverstein, supra note 6. 
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Cowboys, “poured billions of dollars into the local economy, with much 
of it laundered into real estate.”52 During the “Cocaine Cowboys” era of 
the late 1970’s to the 1980’s, “[d]rug money tainted everything from law 
enforcement to real estate to banking.”53 
Looking back on Miami’s history can explain why the city is 
experiencing a money laundering crisis today. The city’s “banking and real 
estate industries grew up during the cocaine era.”54 The attitude in Miami 
has always been “to make a quick deal and don’t ask any questions.”55 
That is the culture of the Miami real estate industry in a nutshell.56 This 
“fast money” culture combined with an influx of billions of dollars of drug 
money developed Miami’s real estate industry into one of the nation’s 
strongest.57 In fact, while the U.S. was in the depths of a recession, the 
infusion of drug money into Miami’s economy “provided demand for an 
estimated 25,000 legitimate jobs in banking, real–estate construction, and 
the service industries.”58 Proceeds from the drug trade caused a sharp 
increase in sales tax receipts for Dade County, giving the county $400 
million extra per year.59 Further, Miami’s Federal Reserve branch had a 
“currency surplus of $5 billion, mostly in drug–generated $50 and $100 
bills,” which was more than the nation’s twelve Federal Reserve banks 
combined.60 
The abundance of drug money funneled through Miami real estate 
caused a development boom similar to the explosion in development that 
is being seen now.61 Ten thousand building permits were issued and more 
than twenty skyscrapers were erected at a time when national construction 
was at a standstill.62 ‘“Cocaine was the currency that built that skyline,”‘ 
said Alex Daoud, Mayor of Miami Beach during the “Cocaine Cowboys” 
era, while he looked at the dense clusters of mainland high–rises across 
Biscayne Bay.63 One veteran real estate broker said that “it was one of the 
busiest times ever” in Miami.64 “At a time when national interest rates 






57 See Gerald Posner, Cocaine Cowboys, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 12, 2009), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2009/10/12/cocaine-cowboys.html (explaining that 
the abundance of money from the drug trade helped fuel real estate development in a time 
where “national interest rates were high and real estate was in a tailspin”). 
58 Id. 
59 See id. 
60 Silverstein, supra note 6. 
61 See Posner, supra note 57. 
62 See id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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were high and real estate was in a tailspin, South Florida was the only 
market where housing prices boomed.”65 Adding even more suspicion to 
an already curious real estate boom, “[a]bout one–third of all property 
transactions were all cash,” at the time.66 To many outsiders, the growth 
in Miami’s real estate industry might seem unexplainable, but the locals 
here knew that “[d]rug profits were clearly pumping up the price of 
property.”67 Adding to the money laundering crisis, the illicit money that 
drove up property values in Miami was “routed in different ways: through 
law firms, offshore corporations, and banks,” which made tracking the 
sources of funds a difficult task for law enforcement agencies.68 
History has seemingly repeated itself because law enforcement 
agencies today are experiencing precisely the same problem of tracking 
sources of funds in real estate transactions.69 It is no surprise that a money 
laundering problem like this could resurface in Miami because the City’s 
real estate and banking industries evolved during the “Cocaine Cowboys” 
era and in the process developed an attitude of making quick deals without 
asking any questions.70 A laissez–faire attitude such as this, unchecked, 
could easily lead to a money laundering crisis, as evidenced by the rampant 
money laundering experienced in the “Cocaine Cowboys” era.71 The 
current money laundering crisis in Miami, explained further in the 
following section, drove FinCEN to issue the GTO as an attempt to 
identify the source of funds for certain real estate transactions and prevent 
money laundering.72 
F. Flooded by a Sea of “Funny Money”: Miami’s Money 
Laundering Crisis 
Miami is awash with “funny money” that has fueled the luxury home 
market in a manner reminiscent of the “Cocaine Cowboys” era of 1980’s 
Miami.73 Within the past two years, the Panama Papers and a high–profile 
trial of an alleged international drug smuggler revealed that for many years 
criminals have been purchasing tens of millions of dollars in luxury Miami 
                                                                                                             
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Rebecca Wakefield, Awash in a Sea of Money, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Oct. 6, 2005, 4:00 
AM), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/awash-in-a-sea-of-money-6339208. 
68 Id. 
69 See Nehamas, supra note 1. 
70 See Silverstein, supra note 6. 
71 See generally Posner, supra note 57 (detailing the many instances of money 
laundering during the “Cocaine Cowboys” era). 
72 See Nehamas, supra note 1. 
73 See id. 
170 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:159 
 
real estate through shell corporations to launder their ill–gotten money.74 
However, this is likely just a drop in the bucket for Miami’s market.75 The 
Panama Papers is a massive trove of leaked confidential files from the 
secretive Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, which was obtained by 
the Miami Herald in association with the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists.76 A Miami Herald analysis of the leaked 
documents revealed that “19 foreign nationals creat[ed] offshore 
companies and [bought] Miami real estate.”77 Of the nineteen, “eight have 
been linked to bribery, corruption, embezzlement, tax evasion or other 
misdeeds in their home countries.”78 
The Panama Papers is the key to understanding how criminals have 
been laundering money through Miami real estate undetected. The Panama 
Papers show that the law firm Mossack Fonseca created offshore shell 
corporations for its clients in tax havens, such as Panama or the British 
Virgin Islands, which do not require owners of the companies to disclose 
their names.79 Those corporations would then purchase luxury real estate 
in Miami with ill–gotten cash, and the U.S. government would never know 
whose money actually purchased the property—until the Panama Papers 
exposed the anonymous buyers.80 
Mossack Fonseca’s conduct confirms what many law enforcement 
officials have long thought: “[m]oney from people linked to wrongdoing 
abroad is helping to power the gleaming condo towers rising on South 
Florida’s waterfront and pushing home prices far beyond what most locals 
can afford.”81 However, this problem is likely much larger than the 
activities exposed by the Panama Papers. In fact, financial institutions in 
Miami “report more suspicious activity than any other major U.S. city 
besides New York City and Los Angeles, according to FinCEN data.”82 
Further, 53 percent of all Miami–Dade home sales in 2015 were made with 
cash—double the national average—and a whopping 90 percent of new 
construction sales were made with cash, according to the Miami 
Association of Realtors.83 And 2015 is no anomaly; “[i]n the first half of 
2013, 73 percent of condo resales by dollar volume were cash deals, 
according to the Miami Association of Realtors.”84 
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Much of the cash flooding the Miami real estate market is flowing 
from international buyers.85 In 2012, nearly 90 percent of condo buyers 
were foreign and that trend has continued in recent years.86 Additionally, 
“[f]oreign nationals bought nearly $6.1 billion worth of homes in Miami–
Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties [in 2015], more than a third of 
all local home spending, according to the Miami Association of 
Realtors.”87 And 25 percent of all home purchases in Miami are made by 
foreign buyers.88 “City boosters touted the foreign investment as a sign 
that Miami had arrived on the world stage.”89 However, the influx of 
foreign money “sent home prices soaring beyond the reach” of many 
families.90 “Locals trying to buy homes with mortgages can’t compete 
with foreign buyers flush with cash and willing to pay the list price or 
more.”91 
Linked to the abnormally large amount of purchases in cash and 
purchases by foreign nationals is the tremendous rise in real estate 
development immediately after the nation’s worst housing crash in its 
history.92 In 2013, Peter Zalewski, a principal with Bal Harbour–based 
Condo Vultures LLC, commented that he was “astounded that, only two 
years after the first post–recession condo broke ground in South Florida, 
there are 152 towers planned, including 70 taking deposits and 32 under 
construction.”93 “That’s one hell of a pace,” Zalewski said.94 Of course, 
not all of the new housing stock will be used for money laundering. Jack 
McCabe, an analyst who studies the Miami housing market, said, “it’s 
impossible to know how many homes are purchased with dirty money.”95 
However, “many people believe it could be a sizable portion of the new 
condominium market in Miami.”96 
Real estate developers also could be a part of the problem of illegal 
money driving the Miami real estate market. McCabe said, “even though 
developers and real–estate professionals suspect many of [their] units are 
bought with illegal funds, they realize their projects may not be successful 
without that support,” which proves that the laissez–faire attitude of the 
“Cocaine Cowboys” era real estate industry is not only alive and well, but 
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also driving the Miami real estate market boom.97 However, Miami’s 
current real estate boom is quite different from its last real estate boom, 
where developers asked for down payments of 10 to 20 percent. Now, 
“many developers ask for upward of 60 percent down—so depositors 
mostly fund buildings.”98 The requirement of such high down payments 
gives developers no reason to look into the source of purchasers’ funds. In 
fact, because developers demand so much money up front, “they often 
aren’t checking the buyer’s source of income,” said Gary Saul, “a 
Greenberg Traurig shareholder who has done legal work for condo 
developers . . . .”99 “The developers don’t know who’s behind it, and I 
don’t think they care,” said Charles Intriago, former assistant U.S. attorney 
and president of the Miami–based Association of Certified Financial 
Crime Specialists, which trains professionals to spot money laundering.100 
“They want to make sales, regulations be damned.”101 This type of quick 
deal–making with no questions asked caused many problems during the 
“Cocaine Cowboys” era and continues to do so today. Real estate 
professionals have been playing fast and loose, allowing criminals to 
launder money unabated for too long, which is precisely why FinCEN 
needed to issue the GTO. 
While there was a definite need for government intervention, the 
Miami money laundering crisis was not a sizeable blip on the federal 
government’s radar until after the high–profile trial of alleged international 
drug smuggler Alvaro López Tardón in September 2014.102 The alleged 
Spanish drug lord owned luxury condos in Miami through legal entities 
registered in his own name or the names of his associates.103 Prosecutors 
argued that he was the leader of a violent drug ring, Los Miami, and that 
he was laundering the profits from his cocaine–smuggling business 
through his Miami condos.104 López Tardón was found guilty of money 
laundering for purchasing luxury cars and real estate with $20 million of 
ill–gotten profits from his drug smuggling operation.105 After his 
conviction, federal agents seized his illegally obtained assets, “including a 
fleet of luxury cars and 13 condos.”106 In late September 2014, when 
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López Tardón was sentenced to 150 years in federal prison for money 
laundering, U.S. District Court Judge Joan Lenard had this to say about 
López Tardón’s $20 million dollar shopping spree: “I call it funny money, 
and we have a plethora of funny money here . . . . Miami is replete with 
people who utilize illegal funds and live a luxurious, unbelievable 
lifestyle.”107 Judge Lenard’s scathing declaration shined a spotlight on 
Miami’s money laundering issue, pressuring the federal government to 
take action. The government eventually took action by issuing the GTO in 
January 2016.108 Miami condo market analyst, Peter Zalewski, commented 
that “López Tardón’s case prompted the feds to take a hard look at Miami 
real estate.”109 “Locally, people have been talking about illicit money 
propping up the condo market since the 1980s,” Zalewski said about 
Miami’s money laundering problem; but “[t]he government usually needs 
a catalyst like this before it can act.”110 
The López Tardón case provided the stimulus the government needed 
to take action, but the totality of the circumstances demanded that swift 
action was necessary. As outlined above, for many years, criminals have 
been using shell companies to launder money through Miami real estate,111 
all cash purchases of Miami real estate have been exceedingly high,112 and 
the Miami real estate market has boomed just after the worst housing crash 
in U.S. history.113 These circumstances and the López Tardón case 
increased pressure on the federal government to crackdown on money 
laundering in Miami. Such a high–profile case involving tens of millions 
in drug profits flowing through the Miami real estate market could have 
reasonably made federal agents believe that Miami was in the midst of a 
“Cocaine Cowboys 2.0” money laundering crisis. To stem the tide of 
illegal money from flooding the Miami real estate market any further, the 
government needed to implement anti–money laundering policy in Miami. 
That is exactly what it did by issuing the GTO. 
III. THE GTO: THE GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPTED CRACKDOWN ON 
MONEY LAUNDERING IN MIAMI 
In January 2016, after years of rampant money laundering and 
suspicious activities in the Miami real estate market, the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—a bureau of the U.S. Department of the 
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Treasury tasked with safeguarding the financial system from illicit use, 
combating money laundering, and promoting national security—issued a 
Geographic Targeting Order (GTO) in Miami–Dade County.114 A 
Geographic Targeting Order is an “order that imposes certain additional 
recordkeeping and reporting requirements on one or more domestic 
financial institutions or nonfinancial trades or businesses in a geographic 
area.”115 A GTO derives its authority to impose these requirements from 
the following sources of law: 31 U.S.C. § 5326(a), 31 CFR § 1010.370, 
and Treasury Order 180–01.116 In general, a GTO requires domestic 
financial institutions or nonfinancial trades or businesses 
to obtain such information as the Secretary [of the 
Treasury] may describe . . . concerning—(A) any 
transaction in which such [business] is involved for the 
payment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or 
currency . . . the total amounts or denominations of which 
are equal to or greater than an amount which the Secretary 
may prescribe; and (B) any other person participating in 
such transaction.117 
Additionally, a GTO requires businesses to “maintain a record of such 
information for such period of time as the Secretary [of the Treasury] may 
require” and “file a report with respect to any transaction described in 
paragraph (1)(A) in the manner and to the extent specified in the order.”118 
The U.S. Treasury Department was concerned with money laundering 
through Miami real estate, so it issued a GTO to track the transactions most 
vulnerable to manipulation: legal entities buying residential real property 
for at least $1 million using cash.119 The purpose of the GTO is to prevent 
money laundering by collecting information about the identities of 
potential money launderers.120 The issuance of the GTO represents the 
Department of the Treasury’s “ceremonial first pitch” of its potentially 
larger crackdown on money laundering through real estate.121 
The January 2016 GTO was effective from March 1, 2016 to August 
27, 2016. During that time, FinCEN said that the GTO generated “useful 
data” that is “helping law enforcement identify possible illicit activity and 
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informing future regulatory approaches.”122 Because the GTO has proven 
to be helpful, FinCEN extended the reach of the GTO to Broward and 
Palm Beach Counties, among others, on July 27, 2016.123 The information 
obtained from the initial GTOs “suggests that we are on the right track,” 
said Jamal El–Hindi, Acting Director of FinCEN.124 “By expanding the 
GTOs to other major cities, we will learn even more about the money 
laundering risks in the national real estate markets, helping us determine 
our future regulatory course.”125 
The GTOs issued to title insurance companies initially generated 
useful information because they required covered businesses involved in 
covered transactions to report such transactions to FinCEN within 30 
days.126 A covered business under the GTO is a “title insurance company 
and any of its subsidiaries or agents.”127 A covered transaction under the 
GTO is a transaction made by (1) a legal entity, (2) which purchases 
residential real property for a total purchase price of $1,000,000 or more 
in Miami–Dade County, and (3) the purchase is made, at least in part, 
using currency or a cashier’s check, a certified check, a traveler’s check, a 
personal check, a business check, or a money order in any form, (4) 
without a bank loan or other external financing.128 For the purpose of 
covered transactions, the GTO defines a legal entity as “a corporation, 
limited liability company, partnership or other similar business entity, 
whether formed under the laws of a state or of the United States or a 
foreign jurisdiction.”129 
The GTO imposes strict reporting requirements on title insurance 
companies involved in transactions where a legal entity purchases 
residential real estate in Miami–Dade County for $1 million or more in 
cash.130 Specifically, the GTO requires that title insurers file a form 8300, 
which FinCEN provides, within 30 days of the transaction.131 The form 
8300 must contain (1) information about the identity of the individual 
primarily responsible for representing the purchaser, (2) information about 
the identity of the purchaser, (3) information about the identity of the 
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beneficial owner(s) of the purchaser, (4) information about the covered 
transaction, and (5) information about the title insurance company.132 
According to the GTO the following must be included in the information 
about the covered transaction: the date of closing of the covered 
transaction, the total amount transferred in the form of payment, the total 
purchase price of the covered transaction, and the address of real property 
involved in the covered transaction.133 
The terms of the GTO are strict and must be followed by title insurers 
because they carry serious civil and criminal penalties.134 The GTO 
provides that the “Covered Business and any of its officers, directors, 
employees, and agents may be liable, without limitation, for civil or 
criminal penalties for violating any of the terms of this Order.”135 The 
“without limitation” language suggests that civil and criminal penalties 
will be pursued to the full extent of the law in the event that a company 
violates the terms of the order. Accordingly, title insurers must pay careful 
attention to the GTO’s requirements when reporting information to 
FinCEN to avoid potential civil and criminal liability. However, this task 
proves harder than it seems due to the many issues and ambiguities 
inherent in the GTO, which will be analyzed further in the following 
section. 
IV. POTENTIAL ISSUES ARISING OUT OF THE GTO 
The GTO on its face seems like a good starting point in the Federal 
Government’s battle against money laundering. However, the GTO is not 
without issues, some of which could render the GTO ineffective or more 
troublesome than it is worth. Similar to the regulation of real estate 
transactions for financial crime and money laundering, the GTO “is worse 
than Swiss cheese for all the holes it’s got.”136 Also, the GTO is riddled 
with ambiguities that make it problematic and expensive to comply with. 
The GTO provides no guidance on many of the difficult situations title 
insurers will inevitably find themselves in while attempting to comply 
with the GTO. If the issues explained in this section are not addressed, the 
GTO will be a worthless weapon in the fight against money laundering. 
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A. Loophole: Title Insurance is not Required Under Florida Law 
The GTO requires only title insurers, their subsidiaries, and their 
agents to report information about covered transactions to FinCEN.137 
However, title insurance is not required under Florida law.138 This 
loophole is probably the easiest way for someone to circumvent the 
reporting requirements of the GTO, though it is risky because the 
purchaser would be gambling that no future title dispute will arise. Title 
insurance is a protection policy against loss if any defect of title to property 
results in a claim against ownership.139  
If a claim is made against your property, title insurance 
will . . . assure you of a legal defense and pay all court 
costs and related fees. Also, if the claim proves valid, you 
will be reimbursed for your actual loss up to the face 
amount of the policy.140 
However, in certain situations—like when purchasing new 
construction—title insurance may not be necessary; thus, many of the 
transactions the GTO aims to track are not covered by the GTO because 
title insurers will not be involved. When buying new construction, “the 
chance of a future title challenge appears low, thus further dimming the 
perceived need for purchasing insurance.”141 Purchasers can also obtain a 
“title search without buying any insurance to confirm there are no liens on 
the property,” which would lower a buyer’s risk of loss and need for title 
insurance.142 New construction sales, the type of transactions with the least 
perceived need for title insurance, seemingly have the most suspicion of 
money laundering surrounding them, evidenced by law enforcement 
officials belief that illegal money is “helping to power the gleaming condo 
towers rising on South Florida’s waterfront.”143 Further, cash deals 
accounted for 90 percent of Miami’s new construction sales in 2015.144 
That exceedingly high rate of cash purchases of new construction supports 
the notion that there is rampant money laundering in new construction 
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sales. Because the vast majority of new construction sales are made in cash 
and there is no major need for title insurance in these transactions show 
that the GTO will not cover many of the transactions it was designed to 
track. 
B. Loophole: The All–Cash Purchase Requirement is Easily 
Circumvented 
A transaction is subject to the GTO only if it was an all–cash 
purchase—transactions made “at least in part, using currency or a cashier’s 
check, a certified check, a traveler’s check, a personal check, a business 
check, or a money order in any form.”145 The GTO does not cover 
purchases without a bank loan or other external financing, including 
electronic fund transfers (EFTs, or wire transfers).146 Therefore, if a shell 
corporation purchases a property using a wire transfer, the transaction 
would not be covered under the GTO and a purchaser could avoid having 
their identity reported to FinCEN. However, “banks already collect 
information about the originator and recipient of EFTs and make that 
information available to regulators upon request,” which could explain 
why FinCEN did not cover EFTs in the GTO.147 Further, FinCEN likely 
wanted to start small and “could have been uncomfortable stretching its 
authority to cover wire transfers,” said Theresa Van Vliet, a former federal 
prosecutor in the Southern District of Florida.148 “This is a strategic move,” 
said Van Vliet, who believes it was smart for FinCEN “to start small.”149 
While it may have been a smart strategic move for FinCEN to start 
small and not extend its power to cover wire transfers, “by not monitoring 
those financial instruments, investigators will miss out on most sales of 
new condos,” said Alan Lips, a Miami accountant.150 With the expansion 
of technology, it makes sense that buyers paying cash to purchase real 
estate would increasingly use wire transfers to pay for the property. This 
fact combined with the fact that wire transfers are not covered by the GTO 
creates a potentially large loophole that is so simple almost anyone could 
take advantage of it. 
Additionally, people could hide their identities from bank regulators 
monitoring EFTs by using a network of LLCs to make a real estate 
purchase, which puts the federal government in a weak position to fight 
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money laundering. Remember, FinCEN likely did not extend its power to 
cover wire transfers under the GTO because “banks already collect 
information about the originator and recipient of EFTs.”151 Because people 
could also hide their identities from bank regulators, the loophole is likely 
more significant than FinCEN would have thought when it decided not to 
cover EFTs in the GTO. To avoid having their identities disclosed to 
federal regulators under wire transfer regulations, people could structure 
the transaction using a network of LLCs. For example, someone using a 
wire transfer to purchase a property in Miami could have the funds 
transferred to the seller from a Florida LLC, owned by an LLC formed in 
the British Virgin Islands, which does not require owners to disclose their 
identities to form an LLC.152 Consequently, the identity of the purchaser 
could not be discovered. 
Because of the simplicity of avoiding federal regulations, the loophole 
created by not including EFTs in the GTO is potentially much more 
substantial than FinCEN may have realized. If FinCEN wants to improve 
its position in the fight against money laundering, it should expand the 
GTO to include EFTs, as a FinCEN spokesperson said it would if “it 
becomes apparent buyers are using [wire] transfers to skirt regulations.”153 
Though, to be fair, anyone tasked with finding information about the 
identity of a purchaser in the situation described above would be hard 
pressed to find anything, which raises important questions about what title 
insurers should do when they face a similar situation. That issue is 
analyzed further later in this section. 
C. Loophole: Trusts are not Subject to the GTO’s Requirements 
The GTO does not cover trusts.154 Accordingly, beneficiaries of trusts 
would not have their identities disclosed if the trusts purchased residential 
real property for $1 million or more in cash, creating a loophole for money 
launderers and anyone else who may want their identity concealed from 
federal regulators.155 The GTO only covers transactions in which the buyer 
of residential real property is a legal entity.156 Under the GTO, “Legal 
Entity means a corporation, limited liability company, partnership or other 
similar business entity, whether formed under the laws of a state or of the 
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United States or a foreign jurisdiction.”157 Noticeably absent from this 
definition are trusts. This drafting exclusion creates a loophole that people 
can take advantage of to circumvent the GTO, thus making the GTO less 
effective in combating money laundering.158 FinCEN should include trusts 
in the GTO’s definition of “Legal Entity” to fill in this gaping hole in the 
GTO. 
D. The GTO Does Not Define “Residential Real Property” 
A transaction is a “covered transaction” under the GTO if the 
transaction is for the purchase of “residential real property.”159 However, 
the GTO never defines “residential real property.” The lack of a definition 
creates an ambiguity in the GTO and makes classifying a transaction as 
“covered” a difficult task for title insurers. This is a problematic situation 
for title insurers because violating the terms of the GTO can result in civil 
or criminal liability, without limitation.160 
On February 1, 2016, after the American Land Title Association wrote 
a letter raising various concerns with the GTO,161 FinCEN issued guidance 
on the question of what “residential real property” is.162 Unfortunately, its 
answer was not sufficiently precise to clarify the ambiguity.163 According 
to FinCEN guidance, “‘residential real property’ means real property 
(including individual units of condominiums and cooperatives) designed 
principally for the occupancy of from one to four families.”164 This 
definition provides some guidance, but it still does not clarify whether 
entire apartment complexes or condominiums are considered “residential 
real property.” In general, these types of property are “considered 
commercial real estate, albeit residential in nature.”165 However, 
FinCEN’s definition includes individual units of condominiums, but does 
that mean that entire condominium buildings are excluded?166 The 
definition also includes property “designed principally for the occupancy 
of from one to four families,” but would a four–unit condominium be 
included in this definition?167 Technically, such a property is designed for 
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the occupancy of four families, but, for an owner, the purpose of this type 
of property likely would be commercial in nature.168 Further, FinCEN’s 
definition neglects to mention how a commercial aspect of a property 
would affect its classification.169 Assuming a four–unit condo is 
considered “residential real property,” how would the presence of offices 
or retail shops in the building affect its classification?170 Under FinCEN’s 
guidance, it is still unclear whether the above described properties would 
be considered “residential real property.” This ambiguity can cause 
significant problems for title insurers that face civil and criminal penalties 
if they violate the terms of the GTO. 
E. Can Title Insurers Bear the Additional Costs of Complying With 
the GTO? 
Complying with the GTO will surely impose additional costs on title 
insurers, but “are title insurance companies equipped to perform the AML 
functions set forth in the GTOs?”171 Kevin L. Shepherd, “chair of the 
American Bar Association Real Property, Trust & Estate Law Section’s 
Working Group on Anti–Money Laundering/Counter–Terrorist Financing 
Efforts Affecting Lawyers,”172 and others in the legal community have 
identified this issue and raised questions about its effect.173 “Banks and 
financial institutions are accustomed to implementing and maintaining 
sophisticated AML procedures and protocols, but it remains to be seen 
whether the title insurance industry will be able to do so—at least in the 
short term.”174 Finding the required information about the parties in the 
transactions, reporting this information, training employees, and extra 
time spent on due diligence will all impose significant costs on title 
insurers. It is unclear what costs the title insurers will bear and what costs, 
if any, will be passed on to the consumer.175 It is clear, however, that 
complying with the requirements of the GTO will impose substantial costs 
on those involved in covered transactions. 
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F. The GTO Provides No Guidance on Compliance or the 
Consequences of Noncompliance 
The GTO provides no guidance on what efforts title insurers should 
use to ensure compliance with the GTO or the consequences of 
noncompliance with the GTO. The Order merely says that noncompliance 
subjects title insurers to criminal and civil liability.176 What happens if a 
title insurer is involved in a transaction where compliance is impossible, 
such as when the beneficial owner’s identity cannot be discovered? Should 
title insurers not participate in these types of transactions? The answer to 
that question is unclear. On one hand, transactions with anonymous 
purchasers are not inherently suspicious as anonymity is a real concern for 
many purchasers.177 The Panama Papers leaks show that even confidential 
documents are at risk for public exposure, which would put purchasers’ 
anonymity at risk. So, it is not accurate for a title insurer to categorize all 
transactions with anonymous purchasers as suspicious, and thus avoid 
them. On the other hand, noncompliance with the GTO when involved in 
covered transactions subjects insurers to serious liability.178 To be safe, 
title insurers must weigh these risks and try to identify the required 
information under the GTO before issuing insurance. 
The GTO also gives no guidance on how title insurers should comply 
with the order. This raises an important question: do title insurers have an 
obligation to find beneficial owners before issuing a policy, or do they 
need only to use best efforts to find and report the information? Luckily, 
FinCen has provided some guidance on this.179 Stephen Hudak, the Public 
Affairs chief for FinCEN, said “we don’t expect [title insurance 
companies] to do investigations, we ask that they make the inquiries and 
report the information provided.”180 “Even if they are lied to by the buyer, 
that information could be useful to law enforcement.”181 Hudak’s 
statement is helpful, but it does not address what the title insurer should 
do if no information about the identity of the purchaser is discovered. 
Should a title insurer leave that part of the Form 8300 blank, or should it 
remove itself from the transaction? Would leaving a part of the Form 8300 
blank be considered noncompliance? It seems prudent to avoid such a 
transaction, as noncompliance carries potential civil and criminal 
punishment, but the obligations of the title insurer involved in such a 
transaction still remain unclear. 
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The various issues identified and explained in this section will 
considerably affect the usefulness of the GTO as an AML tactic and those 
forced to comply with the GTO. The many loopholes in the GTO may 
eventually make it an ineffective weapon in the government’s fight against 
money laundering. The ambiguities in the GTO and the other problems 
stemming from the GTO may ultimately make it more troublesome than it 
is worth. FinCEN must address these issues to ensure that title insurers 
comply with the GTO. 
V. EFFECTS OF THE GTO—MIAMI REAL ESTATE WILL CONTINUE 
TO FLOAT ON A SEA OF ILLEGAL CASH 
The many loopholes and issues inherent in the GTO or resulting from 
the GTO will have various effects on the Miami real estate industry, but 
these loopholes in the GTO will render it ineffective as a means to prevent 
money laundering and will prevent the GTO from negatively impacting 
the Miami real estate market—as many feared it would.182 While the GTO 
may be successful in gathering some information helpful to law 
enforcement agencies,183 it probably will not deter criminals from 
laundering their ill–gotten profits through Miami real estate. The 
numerous loopholes in the GTO, as explained in Section IV, provide too 
many avenues for money launderers to circumvent the reporting 
requirements of the GTO. For instance, someone could make a purchase 
from a trust instead of a covered legal entity, use a wire transfer instead of 
cash to make a purchase, or elect not to purchase title insurance to 
completely avoid having their identity reported to FinCEN under the 
GTO.184 Though these loopholes may stop the GTO from preventing 
money laundering in Miami, they will likely affect how people choose to 
structure certain real estate transactions. 
An increased use of trusts and wire transfers in all–cash real estate 
transactions of $1 million or more should be expected as a result of the 
loopholes in the GTO. The GTO requires information about a legal entity 
to be reported to FinCEN when it buys real estate in an all–cash purchase 
for more than $1 million in Miami, but wire transfers are not covered 
transactions under the GTO and the GTO’s definition of legal entity does 
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not include trusts.185 These gaps in the GTO’s coverage provide ways for 
people to avoid having their identities reported to FinCEN. Thus, people 
that wish to remain truly anonymous in a real estate transaction, for 
legitimate or illegitimate reasons, are now likely to use one of these 
avenues to maintain their anonymity when involved in a transaction that 
would otherwise be covered by the GTO. 
Further, the limited coverage of the GTO could cause an increase in 
money laundering through commercial properties in Miami, as these are 
not covered by the GTO. The GTO covers purchases of “residential real 
property,”186 which FinCEN has defined as “real property (including 
individual units of condominiums and cooperatives) designed principally 
for the occupancy of from one to four families.”187 Most commercial real 
estate would not be covered by this definition of “residential real property” 
because seemingly only one– to four–unit apartment complexes or 
condominiums could fall into this definition.188 Because commercial 
properties are not covered by the GTO, criminals may seek to launder 
money through commercial real estate, which would protect their 
anonymity from the reporting requirements of the GTO, potentially 
shielding them from law enforcement.189 If money laundering through 
commercial real estate grows significantly, then commercial real estate 
prices could be propped up by illegal money similar to what happened in 
the residential market.190 Miami already has a problem with the price of 
real estate being too high for most locals to afford, and propping up 
commercial real estate values would further that problem.191 
Commercial real estate prices likely will not be the only prices on the 
rise. The GTO may also drive the cost of title insurance up in Miami. The 
GTO requires title insurance companies to find and report information 
about the parties involved in covered transactions.192 These 
responsibilities impose substantial additional costs on the title insurers.193 
Finding the required information about the parties in the transactions, 
reporting this information, training employees, and the extra time spent on 
due diligence will all cost title insurers money. The title insurance 
companies will likely pass these additional costs down to consumers, if 
possible, which would surely increase title insurance costs for covered 
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transactions and could even increase title insurance costs for all 
transactions. 
The GTO and the many loopholes and issues inherent in it may affect 
how certain real estate transactions are structured and some other aspects 
of the real estate industry. However, it will not have a significant negative 
impact on Miami’s luxury real estate or new condo markets—as many 
feared it would.194 Initially, many industry professionals feared that the 
GTO would scare off buyers who desire to remain anonymous in real 
estate transactions.195 However, title insurance is not required for real 
estate purchases. Purchasers that wish to preserve their anonymity can 
choose not to purchase title insurance and completely avoid the GTO’s 
reporting requirements because no title insurer would be involved in the 
deal.196 Deciding against purchasing title insurance may seem risky, but 
“you can get a title search without buying any insurance” to confirm there 
are no clouds on the title of a property.197 Further, the risks title insurance 
protects against—clouds on titles—are extremely minimal when 
purchasing a new condo from the developer.198 So, purchasers don’t have 
a pressing need for title insurance in many cases and have alternatives to 
confirm there is no liens on the property. Thus, for purchases of new 
condos, the portion of the market the GTO was feared to affect the most,199 
title insurances companies are not even needed.200 Not purchasing title 
insurance would exempt the transaction from the GTOs reporting 
requirement, preventing any significant negative effect.201 
Furthermore, even if title insurance is purchased, a substantial portion 
of new condo purchases still will not be subjected to the GTO’s reporting 
requirements.202 “By not monitoring [wire transfers and personal checks], 
investigators will miss out on most sales of new condos, said Alan Lips, a 
Miami accountant.”203 Because the GTO will not cover the majority of 
new condo sales, the fears of many real estate professionals that the GTO 
would have a “chilling effect” on the luxury market seemingly were an 
overreaction.204 “‘I think this is really blown out of proportion,’” agreed 
Carlos Rosso, president of the condo division for local mega–developer 
Related Group. ‘Everything is done through the banking system for new 
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construction.’”205 These statements from industry professionals make clear 
that the GTO will not affect most real estate transactions, and thus will not 
have a significant negative effect on the Miami real estate market. 
The downturn currently seen in Miami’s market for new condos, and 
its housing market in general, is more likely attributed to over–supply and 
a strengthening dollar relative to foreign currencies.206 Currently, Miami 
condo prices are declining and likely will continue to fall in the coming 
months.207 “In the latest Q3 condo market statistics for the Greater 
Downtown Miami and the Miami Beaches, prices declined slightly by 
1.4%, and all other leading indicators are soft.”208 “In other words, the 
market is likely to take a further hit,” said Sep Niakan, Owner of HB 
Roswell Realty, a brokerage firm in the Edgewater neighborhood of 
Miami.209 “This latest quarter’s numbers expose a year–over–year 25% 
decline in condo sales volume in the Greater Downtown Miami and the 
Miami Beaches, with 1,213 sales in Q3 2016 versus 1,615 sales in the 
same quarter in 2015.”210 One cause of this downturn is the over–supply 
of condos, as evidenced by Miami’s unprecedented pace of development 
in recent years211 and its exceedingly high absorption rate—“the number 
of months it would take to sell all the properties currently on the 
market.”212 The absorption rate for “a balanced market in Miami is 6–12 
months of inventory depending on the type and price point.”213 However, 
as of October 24, 2016, the absorption rate for Miami condos was “a 
whopping 24.5 months overall inventory.”214 This overabundance of 
supply causes “downward pressure on prices until the inventory 
dissipates.”215 
The other cause of the current downturn in the Miami condo market is 
the growing absence of foreign buyers due to the strengthening dollar 
relative to other foreign currencies.216 Since the summer of 2014, “the U.S 
dollar started to climb against most foreign currencies, which started a 
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slow but steady decline of buyers from those continents.”217 From then 
until November 2016, “the euro has lost 36% of its value, the Brazilian 
real 43% and the Colombian peso 59% against the U.S. dollar.”218 This is 
significant because Miami’s real estate market is driven, in part, by foreign 
investment, which is now much more expensive to do because of the 
strength of the dollar relative to foreign currencies.219 In fact, 25% of home 
purchases in Miami and $6.1 billion worth of real estate in the tri–county 
area were purchased by foreign nationals in 2015.220 So, it makes sense 
that the market would take a downturn when the strong U.S. dollar, in 
relation to weak foreign currencies, caused a significant diminution in 
demand for real estate. 
The GTO’s many issues will render it ineffective as a means of 
preventing money laundering, but those issues also ensure that the GTO 
will not have a “chilling effect”221 on the Miami real estate market. The 
GTO’s under–inclusiveness not only indicates that money launderers have 
many avenues to circumvent the GTO’s reporting requirements, but it also 
signifies that the GTO will not cover many of the transactions it was feared 
to have the worst effect on.222 While the GTO will have various effects on 
the real estate industry, it will not have a major negative impact. The fear 
of a “chilling effect”223 on the Miami real estate market was overblown 
because the current downturn in the Miami market is easily explained by 
the foundational laws of economics—supply and demand.224 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Miami is experiencing a money laundering problem that has not been 
seen since drug money flooded the City’s streets during the “Cocaine 
Cowboys” era of the 1980s. The money laundering crisis derives from the 
laissez–faire attitude towards accepting large sums of cash that developed 
in Miami during the “Cocaine Cowboys” era. The money laundering 
problem has become so sizable because of the lax regulations of cash real 
estate transactions, compared to other means of laundering money, and the 
anonymity that legal entities can provide criminals. 
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To crackdown on the money laundering crisis in Miami, the 
Department of the Treasury, through the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN), issued a Geographic Targeting Order (GTO).225 
Targeted specifically at the causes of the money laundering crisis—lax 
regulations of cash real estate transactions and the anonymity of legal 
entities—the GTO requires title insurance companies to report the identity 
of the beneficial owners of shell companies that purchase real estate with 
cash.226 
While many professionals in the South Florida real estate industry 
believe the GTO would have a “chilling effect on the luxury [real estate] 
market,” the GTO, has many flaws that, if unaddressed, will prevent it 
from stemming the tide of illegal money that is flooding the Miami real 
estate market.227 The GTO’s under–inclusiveness provides money 
launderers with too many avenues to circumvent its reporting 
requirements, and the GTO’s ambiguities will cause problems for title 
insurers that must comply with it. 
The same issues that make the GTO ineffective in preventing money 
laundering also ensure that the GTO will not have a significant negative 
impact on the Miami real estate market—as many feared it would.228 
Because the GTO is under–inclusive, it will not cover most of the 
transactions it was feared to affect the most.229 The current downturn the 
market is experiencing is not due to the GTO and is easily explained by 
the laws of supply and demand.230 While the GTO will have various effects 
on the real estate industry, the fear that it would have a “chilling effect”231 
was overblown. 
VII. GTO UPDATE 
Just before this article was set to be published, FinCEN issued a 
revised GTO that addresses the preceding GTO’s underinclusiveness.232 
“FinCEN is revising the GTOs to capture a broader range of transactions 
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and include transactions involving wire transfers.”233 These revisions 
further my argument that a more inclusive drafting of the GTO is 
necessary to FinCEN’s success in combatting money laundering. Armed 
with a more powerful weapon—a revised GTO—I believe FinCEN finally 
has what it needs to prevail in the fight against money laundering. 
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